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Dog's Bill of Rights
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Actual records trace the mammal Carnivora, family Canidae,
back to the Egyptian tomb of Amten of the Fourth Dynasty -
about 3500 B.C. Since that time the service, devotion and heroism
of the dog have earned him recognition as "Man's Best Friend," a
title enjoyed by no other member of the animal kingdom. Despite
this praiseworthy heredity, man seems to be questioning the under-
lying friendliness of the dog. In the last century, dogs have been
the object of increasing claim compensation. This new source of
lawsuits is significant since there are an estimated 13,000,000 dogs
in the United States - one dog for every ten persons.
In early legal history, the dog was protected by being allowed
"one free bite." But courts have discarded that principle' for a
new legal fiction of liability - a fiction spuriously called "vicious
propensities." While the vicious propensity test appears universal
in the legal literature, its application is variously handled.
Some jurisdictions using the vicious propensity test determine
dog bite liability in terms of nuisance. While a dog is not a nuisance
per se,2 the courts which apply the nuisance theory investigate the
disposition and conduct of the dog and the manner in which he has
been kept in determining the nuisance question. Following this
theory, it has been said that, "a person who keeps a dog which is
dangerous to mankind with knowledge of its vicious propensities is
liable on the theory of nuisance for injuries resulting therefrom to
others, irrespective of the question of negligence on his part."'
Another line of authority establishes liability in terms of negli-
gence. In these cases it is necessary for the plaintiff to establish
the dog's vicious propensities in order to show negligence or fault
on the part of the owner. The negligence or fault is established
1 See, e. g., Andrews v. Smith, 324 Pa. 455, 188 At. 146 (1936).2
Smith v. Costello, 77 Idaho 205, 290 P.2d 742 (1955).
'Annot., 79 A.L.R. 1060, 1062 (1932).
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upon showing that the owner did not take steps which would pre-
vent injury or damage after he became aware of the dog's vicious
nature.4
A third theory of dog bite liability is that which Colorado has
recognized. It appears that the Colorado Supreme Court imposes
strict liability on a dog owner who has prior knowledge of his dog's
vicious propensities. In Barger v. Jimerson,5 the court said, "It is
quite evident that defendants did not at any time carelessly or in-
tentionally allow the dog to run at large. Their liability was in
keeping such a dog and they did so at their peril."6
Another form of strict liability is found in the statutes of Con-
necticut and Massachusetts. These identical statutes impose strict
liability on the keeper of a- dog for any damage which the dog does
unless the damage was a result of trespass (or other tort), or of
teasing, tormenting or abusing the dog.7 Florida," Iowa,9 New
Hampshire, 10 Ohio11 and Rhode Island" have statutory provisions
which are similar in wording and in effect.
Unless otherwise provided by statute, a necessary element of
proof for establishing dog bite liability is proof of the vicious pro-
pensity of the dog. The test for vicious propensity appears to be uni-
versal. The plaintiff must show: (1) that the dog had exhibited certain
tendences, (2) that the tendencies were of the nature to put prudent
persons on guard against possible injury, and (3) that the tendencies
were known to the owner prior to the injury for which redress
is sought.
1 3
The element of vicious propensity being essential in an action
for dog bite regardless of the theory upon which liability is based,
it is obvious that, unless otherwise provided by statute, simple
proof of a dog bite and damage therefrom does not make out a
prima facie case for the plantiff. It is in the area of proof of vicious
propensity that many dog bite claimants fail. The authorities have
set forth some important guide posts for such proof.
Woulfe v. D'Antoni, 158 So. 394 (La. App. 1935).
Barger v. Jimerson, 130 Colo. 459, 276 P.2d 744 (1954).6
Id. at 462, 276 P.2d at 745.
Conn. Gen. Stat. c. 151a, § 1842d (Supp. 1955); Mass. Ann.. Laws, c. 140, § 155 (1949).
5 Fla. Stat. § 767.04 (1953).
Iowa Code § 351.28 (1946).
'oN H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 466.19 (1955).
SOhio Rev. Code Ann. § 955.28 (1953).
R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 639, § 3 (1938).
is See note 5 supro.
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What types of prior tendencies amount to vicious propensities?
Following the rationale of the early "one free bite" principle, a prior
attack on a human has been held sufficient to prove vicious pro-
pensities.' Evidence that a trained watchdog snarled and showed
his teeth when petted by guests at the dog owner's hotel was also
considered sufficient proof.15 The ferocious and violent nature of
a dog as evidenced by his barking, running to and lunging upon a
fence when humans came near the fence has been held, by the
Colorado Supreme Court, to be adequate proof of vicious propen-
sities.' 6 However, the Pennsylvania court has said that the mere
fact that the person bitten was afraid of the dog prior to the bite
does not prove the dog was vicious."
What constitutes adequate owner knowledge of vicious propen-
sities? The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
held that keeping and training a dog as a watchdog warrants the
inference that the owner has knowledge of the dog's vicious pro-
pensities. 8 However, the Pennsylvania court has held that the mere
keeping of a German shepherd to protect property against intruders
is not sufficient to show that vicious propensities were known to
the owner. 9 Constant owner admissions that the dog was "bad,"
made after the injury but prior to the trial, were held to constitute
proof that the admitting owner had knowledge of the dog's vicious
propensities.20 The Colorado court has held that a dog owner had
knowledge of his dog's viciousness upon a showing that he kept the
animal confined because it was inclined to jump at approaching hu-
mans.21 Furthermore, the owner must have had personal knowledge
of the vicious propensities. Thus it has been held that the knowledge
of a neighbor or of the owner's yardman is not imputed to the own-
er.2 However, the knowledge of a servant who has control of the
dog may be imputed. 3 In Colorado, an owner who knows or should
know that his animal has been exposed to rabies is charged with
that knowledge and is liable for the consequences of an injury in-
flicted while his dog is rabid.
4
One might conclude, without consulting the authorities, that a
trespasser has no cause of action for dog bite. However, this posi-
tion is not supported by the courts. The New Jersey Supreme Court
has held that, as a matter of law, the mere fact that the injured
person was a trespasser at the time of an attack by a "vicious"
animal does not defeat his action.25 The theory supporting this
decision was aptly stated in a leading case involving trespassing
persons who are injured by animals found to have vicious propensi-
ties. Thus in Marble v. Ross, 28 the Massachusetts court reasoned
14 See, e. g., Peyronnin v. Riley, 15 La. App. 393, 132 So. 235 (1931).
25 Zarek v. Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1943).
1s See note 5 supra.
17 Fink v. Miller, 330 Pa. 193, 198 Ati. 666 (1938).
18 See note 15 supro.
10 Andrews v. Smith, 324 Pa. 455, 188 Atl. 146 (1936).
Moore v. Smith, 6 So. 2d 803 (La. App. 1942).
' See note 5 supra.
22 See note 4 supra.
2 Benko v. Stepp, 199 Okla. 119, 184 P.2d 615 (1947); accord, Young v. Estep, 178 Wash. 561,
35 P.2d 80 (1934) (chimpanzee).
2 Carlberg v. Willmott, 87 Colo. 374, 287 Pac. 863 (1930).
25 Eberling v. Mutillod, 90 N. J. L. 478, 101 Ati. 519 (1917).
20 Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44 (1878).
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that if a trespasser is injured by an animal which has vicious pro-
pensities known to the owner, the owner vicariously inflicts injury
on the trespasser in a wanton manner. The court supported its posi-
tion by citing the time-honored principle that a landowner may not
inflict a wilful and wanton injury on a trespasser-a position anala-
gous to the spring gun cases so frequently found in texts.
Children are particularly protected aginst the defense of
trespass. In a 1934 Pennsylvania case,27 an owner who kept a dog
with known vicious propensities was held liable to an injured three
year old, notwithstanding the defendant's allegation of trespass.
A Louisiana court imposed liability on an owner of a known vi-
cious dog without considering the owner's allegation that the
twelve year old victim was a trespasser.2 6
In spite of the principle that trespassers are protected against
vicious dogs, it does not follow that trained watchdogs are legal
booby-traps. The determining question in an action by a trespasser
injured by a trained watchdog is the care with which the watchdog
owner has kept his dog. The New York appellate division has
held that a dog known to be vicious can be kept to protect one's
property provided the owner uses caution to confine the dog so that
it may move only in the area where premises are to be protected.29
The owner who meets the standard of caution calculated to avoid
wilful injury to the innocent trespasser need not give the tres-
passer notice of the dog's vicious propensity.2 0
An interesting sidelight on dog bite liability is presented in
cases where business invitees are bitten by dogs. Apparently, in-
vitee status does not alter the vicious propensity test nor does it
alter the application of the test. In Zarek v. Fredericks,"' a federal
court of appeals established that the plaintiff was a business invitee
and then stated, "The question, so far as it concerns liability, is
limited to the sufficiency of proof that the dog was vicious and the
defendant knew or had reason to know that fact."32 Similarly, in
Splaine v. Eastern Dog Club, Inc.," the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts granted "business visitor" status to the plaintiff
and added that the defendant dog club owed the plaintiff a duty to
usc reasonable care to keep the plaintiff, a dog exhibitor, free of
harm from other dogs at the dog show. However the court conclud-
ed that, notwithstanding this duty, there was no proof of the of-
fending dog's vicious propensity prior to its biting the plaintiff and
therefore the defendant was not liable.
Common law liability for dog bite continues in most juris-
dictions, with the qualifications above mentioned, unless changed
by statute or replaced by new legal fictions. If there is any signifi-
cant trend discernable, it is the extending of the definition of vi-
cious propensity to include less offensive kinds of canine conduct.
2 Darbly v. Clare Food and Relish Co., 111 Pa. Super. 537, 170 Atl. 387 (1934).
See note 20 supra.
Woodbridge v. Marks, 17 App. Div. 139, 45 N. Y. Supp. 156 (3d Dep't 1897).
30 Ibid.
138 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1943).
82 Id. at 690.
85 306 Mass. 381, 28 N. E. 2d 450 (1940).
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